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INTRODUCTION
The Internet has made it easier than ever before to stay informed on
current events—and without ever needing to pick up, let alone pay for, a
newspaper. But recent litigation and legislation in the United States and
abroad have challenged the cost-free flow of such information. In March, a
high-profile news-sharing case ended when a judge in the influential South-
ern District of New York1 held that excerpting and distributing news clips to
customers for a fee was not a fair use and infringed the publisher’s copy-
rights.2 Two days later, the German Bundestag passed the ancillary copy-
right for press publishers, effective August 1, 2013, to prohibit news
aggregators from excerpting articles without a license—the so-called
“Google Tax.”3 Critics decried these developments as threatening free
speech, undermining copyright policy goals, and contravening journalism
values.
* Intellectual Property Fellow, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts,
Columbia Law School. Thanks to Sarah Burstein, Jane Ginsburg, Margot Kaminski, Robert
Levine, and Tim Wu for helpful feedback and the MTTLR staff for thoughtful edits.
1. The Southern District of New York is the leading trial court for copyright cases
within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “the de facto Copyright Court of the
United States.” See Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987).
2. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
3. Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes, 23 BUNDESGESETZBLATT
JAHRGANG 1161 (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/Bibliothek/Gesetzesmaterialien/17_wp/Urheberr_Presseverlage_Leistungss
chutzrecht/bgbl.pdf;jsessionid=94973530353C4CD4C9E840357C73E5B9.2_cid344?__blob=
publicationFile. Though the law exempts “snippets,” it does not define the scope of a snippet.
See Robert Levine, In Europe, Google’s News Snippets May Get More Expensive, BLOOM-
BERGBUSINESSWEEK (March 21, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-21/in-
europe-googles-news-snippets-may-get-more-expensive. It is possible that more than a few
words could violate the law, even if only the URL is shared.
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However, such concerns may be misplaced. The opposition to these re-
cent legal developments is rooted in a belief that stronger intellectual prop-
erty protections result in higher tolls, which, in turn, price many consumers
out of accessing and using the information. But often overlooked is an exis-
tential consideration: information-gathering is expensive, and absent effi-
cient tolls there will be far less information to access at all, regardless of
cost. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this principle in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises as it applies more narrowly to whether
copyright law inhibits free expression.4 Identifying the particular importance
of incentives for newsgatherers, this Essay extends the Harper & Row ratio-
nale beyond its copyright mooring.
In light of the continued withering corps of professional newsgatherers,
these legal developments actually could enhance the exchange of informa-
tion and ideas to the extent they preserve incentives for news publishers.
Accordingly, this Essay brackets off the questions of whether fair use pro-
tects news clipping or U.S. copyright law needs a Google Tax. It instead
focuses on whether such legal regimes actually raise the policy concerns that
critics assert.
Countering the perception that speech limitations affecting distribution
necessarily reduce access to information, this Essay proffers that copyright
expansions actually can increase access and thereby serve important copy-
right and First Amendment values. In doing so, this discussion contributes to
the growing literature5 and two recent Supreme Court opinions6 discussing
whether copyright law and First Amendment interests can coexist.
I. DEATH BY A THOUSAND PAPER CUTS
Due in large part to the Internet’s disruptive nature and information-
wants-to-be-free culture,7 the press is facing unprecedented challenges.8 Its
problem is not one of product quality but of distribution and receipts. News-
4. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558–60 (1985).
5. See e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intel-
lectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment
Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082 (2013); Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Jennifer Rothman, Liberating Copy-
right: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010).
6. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
7. See Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, The News Deal: How Price-Fixing and Collu-
sion Can Save the Newspaper Industry—And Why Congress Should Promote It, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 414, 421 & n.31 (2011).
8. See ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE
CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 110–35 (2012);
Greenberg, supra note 7, at 420-24. Between 2005 and early 2012, they lost $27 in print
revenue for every dollar gained in digital revenue. See Alan D. Mutter, Newspaper Digital Ad
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papers produce a public good. Though published information has long been
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, the digital age has facilitated near-instan-
taneous verbatim re-publication by commercial users, thereby magnifying
the difficulties newspapers face in profiting from their investments. Despite
Americans consuming as much news today as they did at the dawn of the
Internet era, far fewer pay for it.9 Consumers want the information that
newspapers gather and disseminate, but without the bill.10 That helps explain
why, adjusted for inflation, print newspaper revenue was lower last year than
at any point since 1950.11
A major disruptive force in news distribution has been the aggregator.12
Generally, a news aggregator scours the Internet for news stories, collecting
and combining the articles of greatest interest to its customers. There are free
news aggregators like Google News, which copies an article’s headline and
first few sentences, and publishes them on interest-specific pages (e.g., Top
Stories, U.S., Technology), much like a traditional newspaper. Another ag-
gregator model is the news-clipping agency, which offers a targeted paid
service. Typically, the agency searches all media for references to a com-
pany’s name, product, or officers; news clips are then sent to the client in
bundled packets.13 Both online news aggregators and clipping services make
it much easier for consumers to find news items of individualized interest.
For example, rather than checking numerous newspaper websites every
morning, a consumer interested in news about “driverless cars” can type
those two words into Google News’ search box and find every story pub-
lished during a specified range of dates.14
The rise of aggregators has coincided with the collapse of the newspaper
business.15 The consequences have been legion: newspaper closures, owner-
Share Hits All-Time Low, REFLECTIONS OF A NEWSOSAUR (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://
newsosaur.blogspot.com/2012/04/newspaper-digital-ad-share-hits-all.html.
9. Trends in News Consumption: 1991–2012, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2012), http:
//www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-even-television-is-vulner
able/.
10. Even online-only newspapers face non-trivial newsgathering expenses, from web-
domain and server-rental fees to transportation costs and reporter paychecks.
11. Mark J. Perry, Free-Fall: Adjusted for Inflation, Print Newspaper Advertising Reve-
nue in 2012 Was Lower than in 1950, AEIDEAS (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://www.aei-
ideas.org/2013/04/free-fall-adjusted-for-inflation-print-newspaper-advertising-in-2012-was-
lower-than-in-1950/.
12. See generally Kimberly Isbell, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, The Rise of the
News Aggregator: Legal Implications and Best Practices, BERKMAN CTR. RES. PUBLICATION
SERIES at 1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670339.
13. News clipping services operate similarly to Google Alerts, though to justify the
expense are expected to be more exhaustive.
14. For August 29, 2013, Google News would have returned 10 results, including arti-
cles from Forbes, AutoWeek, and blogs hosted by the New York Times and Tampa Bay
Tribune.
15. To be sure, aggregators are not even primarily to blame. Economics are responsible,
particularly advertising losses due to the online/print disparity in ad value—digital dimes ver-
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ship consolidations, coverage reductions, massive layoffs.16 While some for-
eign countries have responded with laws to prop up the press,17 U.S. courts
have been asked to wrestle with legal limitations on news aggregators.18
Journalists, legal scholars, and politicians have discussed various measures
directed at stabilizing the press.19 At the same time, private actors have in-
creased pressure on aggregators to license uses, which has reaped some re-
ward for newspapers. To avoid legal liability for Google News, Google
recently agreed to settlements in France and Belgium;20 in the United States,
Google previously settled a similar dispute with the Associated Press (AP)21
sus print dollars—and the downfall of classifieds. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 420–21.
Yet, aggregators add to the economic morass: even when a user clicks through to a newspaper
website, he is likely to skip the homepage, which contains the most valuable advertising space.
16. See Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, A Public Press? Evaluating the Viability of Gov-
ernment Subsidies for the Newspaper Industry, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 192–94 (2012);
Rick Edmonds et al., Newspapers: By the Numbers, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2013
(May 7 2013), http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/newspapers-stabilizing-but-still-threatened/
newspapers-by-the-numbers/ (estimating newspaper editorial staff had fallen 30 percent since
2000 and was under 40,000 industry wide for the first time since 1978). For statistics on
newspaper layoffs and closures between 2007 and 2012, see PAPER CUTS, http://new-
spaperlayoffs.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
17. Beyond Germany, Israel and Italy also reportedly are considering similar copyright
expansions directed at Google News. See Eleonora Rosati, Towards a Google Tax in Italy
Too?, 1709 BLOG (June 2, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2013/06/to-
wards-google-tax-also-in-italy.html; Nati Tucker, Bill Would Force Google to Share 7% of
Israeli Revenues with Websites, HAARETZ (Oct. 9, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/
business/.premium-1.551465.
18. See, e.g., Complaint: Trial by Jury Demanded, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S.
Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01087-DLC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012); Complaint: Jury Trial De-
manded, GateHouse Media Mass. I, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 1:08-cv-12114-WGY (D.
Mass. Dec. 22, 2008); Complaint: Trial by Jury Demanded, Associated Press v. All Headline
News Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00323-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2008); First Amended Complaint for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction & Copyright Infringement, Agence France Presse v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-00546-GK (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2005).
19. Some include newspapers partnering with a copyright enforcement firm, see Brad
A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 153
(2014), a U.S. senator introducing a bill that would make it easier for traditional newspapers to
operate as tax-exempt 501(c)(3)s, see Newspaper Revitalization Act, S. 673, 111th Cong. § 1
(2009), and legal scholars evaluating government assistance, see David M. Schizer, Subsi-
dizing the Press, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2011), and the suitability of a federal “hot news”
doctrine, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011). I have proposed two measures: a narrow and limited antitrust
exemption to enable newspapers to collaborate on a model for charging for online content, see
Greenberg, supra note 7, at 428-29, and the establishment of a National Public Newsroom
modeled after NPR, see Greenberg, supra note 16, at 241-44.
20. Mathew Ingram, Why Google’s Settlement with French Publishers is Bad for the
Web, GIGAOM (Feb. 4, 2013 8:10 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/02/04/why-googles-settle-
ment-with-french-publishers-is-bad-for-the-web/ (“[T]he settlement is being described as a
‘pay for links’ deal, and that perception is dangerous.”).
21. See Jeffrey D. Neuburger, A Brief History of AP’s Battles with News Aggregators,
PBS (May 26, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2009/05/a-brief-history-of-aps-battles-
with-news-aggregators146.
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and last year several U.S. news organizations, including AP, The New York
Times Co., and The McClatchy Company, created a system called New-
sRight to track unpaid online uses and push licenses to aggregators.22
There is good reason for the focused attention. It is about more than a
romantic notion of holding a newspaper at the breakfast table, about more
than perpetuating a power structure that serves publishers. Newspapers con-
tinue to serve an integral role in democratic society, and copyright plays a
critical part in protecting press freedoms and independently funding new-
sgathering operations.23 Thus, even if efforts to preserve financial incentives
for newspaper publishers mistakenly enlist copyright, they are not
misplaced.
II. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS NEEDS NEW INFORMATION
An important theory shaping First Amendment doctrine is the market-
place of ideas. Though famously articulated by Justice Holmes,24 the market-
place concept goes back to colonial America and presumes that competition
among ideas, fostered by free exchange, will result in the best ideas becom-
ing the accepted ones. The Internet has made it much easier to share ideas,
giving every speaker a platform traditionally available only those with ac-
cess to the press,25 to perform in-depth research on discrete issues, and to
engage in geography-defying communities. This, in theory, should provide
for a more robust marketplace.
But the financial decline of the newspaper industry has led to a massive
reduction in professional newsgatherers, which, in turn, has reduced current
informational contributions to the marketplace of ideas. The traditional press
remains the primary supplier of newsgatherers and new information; the
emergence of new media has not changed that.26 New media has skewed
attention toward national and global news and away from more narrowly
appealing state and municipal issues, and has reduced costly and time-con-
22. Rick Edmonds, AP, 28 News Orgs Launch NewsRight to Collect Licensing Fees
from Aggregators, POYNTER (Jan. 5, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/bus-
iness-news/the-biz-blog/157817/ap-28-news-orgs-launch-newsright-to-collect-licensing-fees-
from-aggregators/.
23. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 316 (2008); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
24. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
933, 936 (2008); Greenberg, supra note 7, at 445.
26. See How News Happens, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.journalism.
org/2010/01/11/how-news-happens/ (finding that 95 percent of stories with “new information”
comes from traditional media, primarily newspapers); see also In re 2006 Quadrennial Regula-
tory Review, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010, 2042 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward
a Better Competition Policy for the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies
that Support the Media Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101,
114–16 (2009); Greenberg, supra note 7, at 445–46.
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suming investigative reporting.27  Additionally, reporting accuracy and cred-
ibility are more limited with new media,28 particularly with crowdsourced
news. Crowdsourcing can help disseminate initial information about a break-
ing and rapidly changing situation, such as natural disaster or terror attack,
more quickly than newspaper websites and cable news channels. But crowd-
sourced information often is incomplete29 and incorrect.30 And Americans,
though increasingly getting their news online, remain skeptical about its ve-
racity, with the majority of participants in a recent study saying that at least
half of the information they get online is not reliable.31
Newspapers also remain central to other First Amendment theories of
the press’s place in democracy. Whether publishing in print or online, news-
papers staffed by full-time reporters facilitate democratic self-governance by
disseminating empowering information32 and serve as a check on govern-
27. See Greenberg, supra note 16, at 199 n.45.
28. To be sure, some new media organizations outperform traditional media in supply-
ing new and democracy-enhancing information. ProPublica, a nonprofit of about twenty edito-
rial employees that is supported by a major philanthropic endowment, and the political news
site Politico are superb examples. The new venture of eBay founder Pierre Omidyar also has
been welcomed with much fanfare. See Ryan Chittum, The Extraordinary Promise of the New
Greenwald-Omidyar Venture, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:50 AM), available
at http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/the_extraordinary_promise_of_t.php. But these business mod-
els are sui generis, and they are staffed by professional newsgatherers (indeed, some promi-
nent newspaper ex-pats).
29. Though also true of articles by professional newsgatherers, the holes are less likely
to be filled by the crowd once the moment has passed and a new trending topic has come to the
fore.
30. Crowdsourcing in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, in which a miss-
ing college student was incorrectly identified as one of the bombers by Twitter and Reddit
users, serves as a stark example. See Gerry Shih, Boston Marathon Bombings: How Twitter
and Reddit Got It Wrong, INDEP. (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/boston-marathon-bombings-how-twitter-and-reddit-got-it-wrong-8581167.html; see
also Craig Silverman, Visualized: Incorrect Information Travels Farther, Faster on Twitter
Than Corrections, POYNTER (March 7, 2012), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/regret-the-
error/165654/visualized-incorrect-information-travels-farther-faster-on-twitter-than-correc-
tions/.
31. USC ANNENBERG SCH. CTR. FOR DIGITAL FUTURE, THE 2010 DIGITAL FUTURE PRO-
JECT 70-81 (2010), available at http://www.digitalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/20
10_digital_future_report-year9.pdf.
32. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585 (1983) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (“[A]n untram-
meled press [is] a vital source of public information . . . and an informed public is the essence
of working democracy.”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON-
STITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1965) (arguing that the First Amendment is designed
to foster democratic self-governance by ensuring that “no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief,
no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from [citizens].”); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in
the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 965–66 (2008) (Traditional media “still supply
an invaluable and unequaled layer of accreditation, fact checking, agenda setting, and wide-
ranging and systematic investigative reporting, while reaching a mass audience and represent-
ing public opinion before powerful decisionmakers.”).
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ment actions.33  They also help set the public agenda and expose community
members to opposing views. In this regard, newsgathering contributions tend
to serve dual constitutional roles: they advance both copyright values of pro-
moting cultural progress and First Amendment values of informing ideas
and facilitating self-governance. Though the Supreme Court has said that
news reporting is more prone to fair use because it is informational in na-
ture,34 jurisprudence also indicates it is of critical importance that new-
sgathering and publishing remain financially viable.35
To be clear, this Essay is not premised on a theory of press exceptional-
ism.36 Instead, it embraces a theory of newsgatherer exceptionalism. And
although “any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to
the flow of information to the public,”37 newspapers remain the primary sup-
plier of newsgatherers (who also happen to carry the imprimatur of greater
accuracy and credibility). Thus, I focus on the sustainability of the newspa-
per industry as vital to preserving contributions of new information gener-
ally, and investigative and local news specifically.
The nature of most new media is quite different from traditional news-
papers, even those that no longer publish a print edition. Although news
aggregators like Google News might supplant the market for newspapers,
aggregators do not offer a substitute product for gathering and organizing
new information into readable stories.38 Without original news sources,
Google News would be almost indistinguishable from Google’s minimalist
33. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
34. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563–64 (1985)
(discussing the scope of the fair use defense to copyright infringement, codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2012)).
35. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238–41 (1918). The mod-
ern concern is not that newspapers are not compensated for the full social value of their contri-
butions, but that they do not receive compensation sufficient to survive. This distinguishes the
need for additional newsgathering incentives from other products protected by intellectual
property. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing that free riding rhetoric is misplaced in intellectual property discus-
sions and that in no other area of the economy do producers fully internalize all social value);
see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025
(2011). Whether the First Amendment confers positive rights for the press is unclear, but I find
persuasive Eugene Volokh’s claim that the Framers were concerned with protecting the press
as a technology for disseminating information, and not as an industry. See generally Eugene
Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the
Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012).
37. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972).
38. This helps reconcile the seeming tension between publishers’ position that they do
not want Google to aggregate their content but do want Google to optimize search results.
(Indeed, a newspaper currently could prevent Google News from publishing even a snippet by
placing a “robots.txt” file on its news site; that would prevent crawling by all search engines,
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homepage, lacking any news content. And like Google News, most new me-
dia operations contribute a product that is at best supplemental to that of
newspapers.39 The Internet has dramatically expanded the sharing of ideas,
yet few new media organizations contribute much new information to en-
hance the debate over ideas—or to inform readers that a debate is needed at
all.
This phenomenon undermines a primary basis for the marketplace of
ideas. Developing ideas relies on the availability of competing information.
When information is recycled from one source, it creates a redundancy in the
market; copies of the same information cannot vie for acceptance. Worse,
the segregating nature of the Internet reduces exposure to oppositional ideas
by enabling consumers to avoid disagreeable stories, facts, ideas, and opin-
ions; the traditional newspaper bundle encumbered this avoidance by giving
readers news about the local water board along with sports scores and the
stock report, and by inviting opposing columnists.40 The result is a demo-
cratic participant who spends more time consuming news but has less
knowledge of contrary ideas and less information about lower-profile, typi-
cally local, news items that in today’s media landscape may not be reported
at all.
III. ACCESS-PRESERVING TOLLS?
At its core, this Essay stands for a simple but often overlooked proposi-
tion in the discussion of information policy: absent existence, there can be
no access. Accordingly, despite the value that aggregators add by dissemi-
nating information more broadly than most newspapers, usage fees could be
advisable on policy grounds, whether premised on copyright, tort, or some
legal regime.
Nearly a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press that newsgathering is expensive and
not just those involved in news aggregation.) But publishers like search because they believe it
supplements readership while aggregation, they argue, supplants it.
39. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 434–38.
40. Cass R. Sunstein, So Much for Serendipity in Personalized News, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 12, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/so-much-for-seren-
dipity-in-personalized-news.html (discussing newspapers’ “architecture of serendipity”); see
also Scott L. Althaus & David Tewksbury, Agenda Setting and the “New” News: Patterns of
Issue Importance Among Readers of the Paper and Online Versions of the New York Times, 29
COMM. RES. 180 (2002) (finding that study participants who read the print version of the New
York Times had a different perception of important political issues and could recognize and
recall more stories from a broader variety of topics than participants who read the online
version of the New York Times); Paige Madsen, Aggregating Agendas: Online News Aggre-
gators as Agenda Setters (Sept. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author)
(finding that Google News prioritizes topics of less interest to editors at the New York Times
and Los Angeles Times, including sports, entertainment, business, and technology, and also
finding that Google News’ higher photo-to-article ratio makes it more difficult for readers to
quickly judge a story’s importance).
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that newspapers require adequate incentives to provide an important public
good.41 Similarly, both Germany’s Google Tax and Associated Press v.
Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.42, holding that news clippings infringed copy-
rights, were concerned with protecting newspaper incentives because of the
business’s positive externalities. It is important, then, that such protections
are in fact likely to increase newspaper revenues and can do so without im-
posing an unnecessary burden on others that would offset the value of pre-
serving informational access.
The available evidence portrays a murky picture about the economic
value of restricting aggregators. Google quickly responded to Germany’s
passage of the ancillary copyright for publishers by saying it would make
Google News opt-in for German publishers.43 Though far too early to know
the consequences in Germany, one possibility playing out elsewhere sug-
gests that a prohibition on third parties aggregating news articles without the
publishers consent will not necessarily increase newspaper revenues. In late
2012, 90 percent of Brazil’s daily circulation newspapers opted out of
Google News after the Brazilian National Association of Newspapers ad-
vised members that the service reduces the likelihood that an Internet user
will click through to read the entire article on a newspaper’s website.44 Opt-
ing out immediately resulted in a roughly 5 percent reduction in online traf-
fic, but the long-term effects remain to be seen.45 Removing freely
accessible news aggregation from the Internet could motivate more news
consumers to visit the websites of the newspaper(s) that they trust to report
on issues of interest. Moreover, removing aggregated news could empower
more newspapers to charge for online content because it is much easier to
sell your product when someone else is not already giving it away for free.46
Alternatively, a news aggregator that suddenly has a shortage of cost-free
content could be motivated to license from newspapers and other media,
41. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238–41, 245 (1918). This opin-
ion is the source of the “hot news” doctrine, which is only available, if at all, under state law
and even then is largely preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act. See Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 902–03 (2d Cir. 2011).
42. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
43. Loek Essers, Google News Opt-In is Not Good Enough, German Publishers Say,
PCWORLD (June 25, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2042923/google-news-
optin-is-not-good-enough-german-publishers-say.html.
44. Robert Andrews, Google News Faces Mass Newspaper Boycott in Brazil, PAIDCON-
TENT (Oct. 19, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/10/19/google-news-faces-mass-
newspaper-boycott-in-brazil/.
45. Gregory Ferenstein, Brazil’s Google News Boycott Reportedly Only Drops Traffic
5%. Oof., TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 26, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/26/brazils-google-
news-boycott-reportedly-only-drops-traffic-5-oof/ (reporting that the modest decrease “not
only justifies their own protest but could inspire a mass revolt online”).
46. To be sure, newspapers likely never will be able to rely only on far less-valuable
online advertising revenue.
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which apparently is the end that newspaper trade organizations and publish-
ers seek.47 Either way, it is possible that newspaper revenue from aggre-
gators would increase over the long term.
The result of restricting news clipping is similarly unproven, but is more
intuitively beneficial to newspapers. The court in Meltwater addressed
whether a news clipping service violated a news publisher’s copyrights by
using “automated computer programs or algorithms to copy or ‘scrape’ an
article from an online news source, index the article, and deliver verbatim
excerpts of the article to its customers in response to search queries.”48 The
court held that such verbatim copying was an infringement not protected by
fair use,49 and found that refusing to pay AP’s licensing fees—annually,
hundreds of millions of dollars from 8,000 licensee customers—would harm
AP’s revenue in two ways.50 First, Meltwater’s refusal to pay resulted in a
direct loss of income related to those uses. Second, and more significantly,
Meltwater’s business model gave it a competitive advantage over AP licen-
sees, who in turn would be spurred to reduce purchases, back out of licenses,
or close shop altogether. The court went on to hold that prohibiting free
riding would preserve AP’s newsgathering incentives—and that was a sig-
nificant policy consideration.51
The Meltwater decision adopts the publisher-friendly perspective that
stronger copyright protection would stabilize at least a portion of newspa-
pers’ revenue stream, but much remains unknown and the economics involv-
ing both types of news aggregators would benefit greatly from in-depth
empirical study. The biggest challenge to restricting news aggregation to
preserve informational access long-term is that neither measure is likely to
do more than slow the decline of newspaper losses. Yet, a single panacea for
preserving the corps of professional newgatherers is unlikely; a cocktail may
47. See Miguel Helft, Google Insists It’s a Friend of Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/technology/internet/08google.html (reporting that
the Associated Press would require Google News and other websites using content from the
AP and its member organizations to pay for a license); Old Media Wants a Piece of the New
Media Action, ADWEEK (Feb. 6, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/
old-media-wants-piece-new-media-action-83886 (discussing plans by a Paris-based organiza-
tion representing 18,000 newspapers to get members “a cut of the money Google makes from
search-ad results”); Urgent Action Plan to Help Regional Press, SOCIETY OF EDITORS (March
24, 2009), http://www.societyofeditors.co.uk/page-view.php?page_id=139&parent_page_id=
0&news_id=1236 (detailing a letter in which two organizations representing British editors
and newspapers pushed government officials to “look urgently for effective ways in which
Google and others could be prevented from profiting from third party content without recom-
pense to or consent from those who generated the material.”).
48. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 543
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
49. Id. at 550–61.
50. Id. at 542.
51. Id. at 553. The court’s reasoning was based solely on AP’s copyright claim and not
its hot news claim. Though the court’s language evokes International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the court did not mention the case.
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be required. Accordingly, a prophylactic measure should not be disregarded
simply because it would provide only partial relief.
Assuming stronger copyright protection provides a financial benefit to
newspapers, the next question is whether these laws balance the financial
needs of newsgatherers with policy concerns about restrictions on informa-
tion sharing. To the extent that these copyright expansions52 place a “re-
write” constraint on third parties distributing a newspaper’s copyrighted ma-
terial, they appear narrow in scope, tailored only to limiting certain repro-
ductions, and leaving open other methods by which to communicate the
information.53 For example, Meltwater can identify and share news clips but
cannot include the copyrighted expression within the clips; it must write its
own short summaries. A U.S. version of Germany’s Google Tax would pro-
hibit the operation of news-aggregating websites that directly copy more
than an article’s headline;54 as with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
anti-circumvention provision, a Google Tax would create a presumption that
fair use is unavailable as a defense.55 Unless such a law expressly forbade
linking to a news article—and that much broader prohibition would raise
distinct policy concerns—news aggregators could still operate as directories
for top headlines. This model is familiar to readers of the heavily trafficked
Drudge Report, which provides only an excerpt of the headline and a hyper-
link and, thus, is more likely to drive traffic to the original source.56 The
immediate burden on aggregators is limited and leaves substantial channels
for cheaply collecting and sharing the same information.
Additionally, news aggregation restrictions inhibit access only to the ag-
gregators. Articles remain accessible from original sources, though newspa-
per websites increasingly charge for access to all content, or to content after
n free stories per month. That could price some consumers out of reading the
original story in its place of original publication. Importantly, however, limi-
tations on news aggregators may perpetuate long-term access if they help a
newspaper stay in business. In turn, that would preserve access to new infor-
mation that would not be discovered and distributed but for the newspaper’s
efforts. Though access may come at a higher cost, consumers likely would
receive the added benefit of keeping those news providers around longer.
52. They are expansions to the extent they either did not previously exist in their respec-
tive legal regimes or were not judicially recognized.
53. Again, whether that is a correct application of fair use is beyond this Essay.
54. Headlines generally are believed to be precluded from U.S. copyright because they
fall within the exclusion for “words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans.” 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2013); see also Robert Denicola, News on the Internet, 23 FORDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 68, 77 (2012) (“[N]o court has ruled on the copyrightability of
news headlines under U.S. law.”). However, a British court recently held that newspaper head-
lines can meet British copyright standards. See Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Meltwater
Holding BV, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 890, [16].
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012); Netanel, supra, note 5, at 1113–15.
56. See DRUDGE REPORT, http://www.drudgereport.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
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CONCLUSION
The Internet has upended newspaper economics. Because newspapers
remain the primary contributor of new information to the marketplace of
ideas, the decline in the press portends significant problems for effective
self-governance. Recent legislation, legal opinions, and private ordering
could help stabilize newspaper revenues. To that end, restrictions on the free
sharing of news actually could preserve access, even as they erect new toll-
booths on the information superhighway.
